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A. Stochastic programming offers handy instruments to analyze
exchange of goods and risks. Absent efficient markets for some of those items,
such programming may imitate or synthesize market-like transfers among con-
cerned parties. Specifically, using shadow prices (Lagrange multipliers) on ag-
gregate endowments, one may identify side-payments that yield core solutions
to cooperative production games.
1. Iusc
Economics depends on - and amply demonstrates - theoretical and practical advan-
tages stemming from exchange of private goods. Similarly, insurance thrives and
builds on mutual benefits derived from pooling and sharing private risks. Sometimes
however, appropriate markets or institutions are not there to mediate desirable trans-
actions. Then, as is well known, optimization methods, and notably duality theory,
may help in assessing the value of potential exchanges. Less known is that opti-
mization can also single out price-based transfers (or side-payments), these serving
as surrogates for reasonable market-like deals.
The following example, first studied by Owen [14], illustrates such issues well:
Suppose each agent i, belonging to a finite society I, faces a linear program
v
i
:= max
{
c · x
∣
∣
x ≥ 0, b
i
−Ax ≥ 0
}
, (1)
assumed feasible, with finite value v
i
. Here A is construed as a m × n activity
matrix; the vector b
i
∈ R
m
denotes i’s bundle of m different resources; and finally,
c ∈ R
n
accounts for unit contributions created by activity plans x ∈ R
n
+
. Most often
the said resources come in non-desirable proportions, causing shortages, excesses, or
bottlenecks. Flexibility and gains can then be had by pooling the privately held
endowments. Specifically, a coalition S ⊆ I, whose members altogether control the
resource bundle b
S
:=
∑
i∈S
b
i
, could achieve an optimal value
v
S
:= max
{
c · x
∣
∣
x ≥ 0, b
S
−Ax ≥ 0
}
(2)
which exceeds the individually assembled revenue: v
S
≥
∑
i∈S
v
i
. So, given advan-
tages in aggregation, it is fitting to ask: How can potential gains of cooperation be
secured and split? For a quick and motivating answer, suppose there is an optimal
∗
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dual solution (a so-called Lagrange multiplier) y¯ to problem (2) when S = I. That
price vector y¯ evaluates (marginal) resources for the grand coalition S = I. Therefore,
quite naturally, let i be offered payment u
i
:= y¯ · b
i
for handing his holding over to
the cooperative enterprise. Will he accept that offer? Yes, most likely! In fact, as it
turns out, since
∑
i∈I
u
i
= v
I
, this payment scheme covers the bill. Moreover, since
∑
i∈S
u
i
≥ v
S
for all S ⊂ I, nobody has economic incentives to object.
While following Evstigneev, Flåm [4], and Sandsmark [17], Owen’s model will be
extended here to accommodate uncertainty, nonlinearity, and several stages.
1
That
much generality notwithstanding, it happens, under convexity assumptions, that
rather similar results remain valid. Intuitively, and as already noticed, resource pool-
ing facilitates substitutions andmitigates bottlenecks. Present uncertainty, that oper-
ation becomes even more important: It reduces environmental vagaries; it smoothens
the effects of individual ups and downs. Put differently: Pooling allows not only
reallocation over activities (or production lines) but also across events (or states of
the world). Granted convexity and strict feasibility of the aggregate program, I shall
show that total payoff may efficiently be split to the rational protest of nobody. In-
deed, a so-called core cooperative solution is then easily synthesized by means of a
Lagrange multiplier.
Building blocks and arguments for that result are organized below as follows.
Section 2 begins by reviewing that part of stochastic programming which comes into
play. Section 3 goes on to define an underlying, transferable-utility, cooperative game
in its reduced, characteristic form. Section 4 exhibits core solutions, and section 5
concludes with a brief look at cooperation over time.
Some motivation for this note stems from the fact that economists and program-
mers often seem opposed (or rather ambivalent) about what sorts of decision-making
constitute proper domains to explore. A narrow view holds that economics mainly
reduces to the study of markets, whereas optimization primarily concerns single-
agent planning. A broader view, exemplified below, encompasses collective action,
self-interested agents, optimization, and market-inspired contracts.
2. S P
Planning under uncertainty is always construed here as an optimization problem of
the following generic form [5], [11], [15], [16]:
Maximize a real-valued, transferable (monetary) payoff f
0
(x) = f
0
(x(·)) over suit-
able, finite trajectories x = x(·) = (x
1
(·), . . . , x
T
(·)) of random vectors x
t
(ω) ∈ R
n
t
.
These vectors represent constrained choices - made sequentially, one at each stage or
time t = 1, 2, . . . , T (< ∞) - under imperfect knowledge about the scenario or state
ω ∈ Ω of the world. Although ω cannot be fully identified a priori, its probability
distribution P is here presumed known; it is given exogenously and defined on some
sigma-field F
T+1
in Ω. Identification of ω improves over time. Specifically, there is
an expanding family F
1
⊆ . . . ⊆ F
T
⊆ F
T+1
of sigma-fields - or an unfolding scenario
1
Related studies include [7], [8], [9], [10], [18].
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tree - which describes the information flow. At time t one may ascertain for any event
in F
t
- and such events only - whether it has happened or not. In particular, a finite
F
t
would partition Ω into minimal events (atoms, information sets, decision nodes)
pertaining to time t. The inclusion F
t
⊆ F
t+1
, t ≤ T, which reflects progressive
acquisition of knowledge, says that the said partition becomes finer as time evolves.
At time t the decision-maker implements the part x
t
of his overall plan x =
(x
1
, . . . , x
T
). That part is supposed to be a F
t
-measurable strategy (policy, behavioral
rule) x
t
: Ω → R
n
t
. This means that only available information is used at any
stage; decisions must be based on observable, realized events. If so, the process x =
(x
1
, . . . , x
T
) is declared adapted to the filtration (F
t
)
T
t=1
. For example, let θ
1
, . . . , θ
T
be a stochastic process, defined on Ω, and let F
t
be generated by θ
1
, . . . , θ
t
. Then
F
t
-measurability of x
t
means that it depends on no more than θ
1
, . . . , θ
t
. Henceforth
only adapted processes are considered.
A mathematical issue crops up here, namely: Where does item x
t
reside? Can-
didate addresses would be in spaces L
p
t
(F
t
, P ;R
n
t
) for suitable p
t
∈ [1,+∞]. Be-
ing concerned below with modelling, and motivated by computation, I shall shy
away from these technicalities and simply assume that Ω be finite. Then all spaces
L
p
t
(F
t
, P ;R
n
t
), p
t
∈ [1,+∞], are topologically equal, and each is regarded as finite-
dimensional Euclidean. (Nonetheless, the presentation below opens for extensions to
infinite Ω.)
Besides informational limitations, and the insistence on adaptive processes, there
are other restrictions, one being that
x
t
(ω) ∈ X
t
(ω) almost surely for each t. (3)
Here ω  X
t
(ω) ⊆ R
n
t
is a nonempty closed F
t
-measurable random set; see e.g.
[1]. (For notational simplicity all inclusions that involve random objects are hence-
forth tacitly understood to hold almost surely. Similarly, all equalities or inequalities
between random vectors, mentioned below, hold with probability one and componen-
twise.) Added to set-constraint (3) comes a family of explicit, functional constraints:
f
1t
(ω, x) := f
1t
(ω, x
1
(ω), . . . , x
t
(ω)) ∈ R
m
t
+
for all t, (4)
this inclusion featuring a vector-valued function f
1t
which is F
t
×Borel-measurable.
For short I write x ∈ X and f
1
(x) ≥ 0 to indicate satisfaction of (3) and (4), respec-
tively. Planning under uncertainty is now formalized succinctly as problem
(P ): sup {f
0
(x) | x ∈ X and f
1
(x) ≥ 0} ,
assumed feasible with finite optimal value, denoted sup(P ). To open up for duality
let
R
1
:= {r
1
= (r
1t
) | r
1t
: Ω → R
m
t
is F
t
-measurable, ∀t}
denote the (canonical) space of additive right-hand-side perturbations in f
1
(x) ≥ 0.
Any member r
1
of R
1
transforms the latter inequality into f
1
(x) ≥ r
1
. Correspond-
ingly, define
Y :=
{
y = (y
t
)
∣
∣
y
t
: Ω→ R
m
t
+
is F
t
-measurable, ∀t
}
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as the non-negative cone of adapted multipliers. Since a special sort, called Lagrange
multipliers, will be crucial in the sequel, an existence result (Theorem 1) is provided
shortly. For the statement let E denote the expectation operator with respect to
probability measure P.
Proposition 1 (A Fritz John multiplier rule). Suppose problem (P ) has finite opti-
mal value sup(P ). Suppose also that the convex hull of the set
C := {(r
0
, r
1
) ∈ R×R
1
: f
0
(x)− sup(P ) ≥ r
0
, f
1
(x) ≥ r
1
for some x ∈ X}
has (0,0) at its boundary. Then there exists a nonzero (r
∗
0
, r
∗
1
) ∈ R
+
× Y such that
sup {r
∗
0
f
0
(x) + E [r
∗
1
· f
1
(x)] : x ∈ X} = r
∗
0
sup(P ). (5)
Proof. Through the boundary point (0,0) of C there passes, by assumption, a closed
supporting hyperplane. Hence some nonzero (r
∗
0
, r
∗
1
) ∈ R×Y defines a continuous
linear functional (r
0
, r
1
) → r
∗
0
r
0
+ E [r
∗
1
· r
1
] which is ≤ 0 on C. (Were not Ω finite,
then additional assumptions might be needed to justify these claims.) Clearly,
(r
0
, r
1
) ∈ C & (r
0
, r
1
) ≥ (r
′
0
, r
′
1
) ∈ R×R
1
⇒ (r
′
0
, r
′
1
) ∈ C.
Therefore, (r
∗
0
, r
∗
1
)  0. Since [f
0
(x)− sup(P ), f
1
(x)] ∈ C whenever x ∈ X, it follows
that r
∗
0
[f
0
(x)− sup(P )] + E [r
∗
1
· f
1
(x)] ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X, this inequality implying
sup {r
∗
0
f
0
(x) + E [r
∗
1
· f
1
(x)] : x ∈ X} ≤ r
∗
0
sup(P ).
The reverse inequality follows from r
∗
1
· f
1
(x) ≥ 0 whenever x is feasible. 
Convexity played a key role in Proposition 1. So, some arguments in support of
that property are called for. To that end, suppose f := (f
0
, f
1
) is concave-like on
X. This means that for any two points x
′
, x
′′
∈ X and any number ρ ∈ (0, 1), there
should exist a third point x ∈ X such that f(x) ≥ ρf(x
′
) + (1 − ρ)f(x
′′
). Under that
assumption C becomes convex, and then (0,0) belongs to its boundary. This obser-
vation shows that (5) is rather well motivated - and especially so for convex instances.
Associate now to problem (P ) its ”ordinary” Lagrangian
(x, y) ∈ X × Y → L(x, y) := f
0
(x) + E [y · f
1
(x)] .
Theorem 1 (Normal Lagrange multipliers). Assume (5) and the following strict fea-
sibility condition: for any right-hand-side perturbation r
1
∈ R
1
that belongs to some
open set containing 0, one can find x ∈ X satisfying f
1
(x) ≥ r
1
. Then then there
exists a multiplier vector y ∈ Y such that sup(P ) = sup
x∈X
L(x, y).
Proof. Let V denote a vicinity of 0 such that for any r
1
∈ V some x ∈ X sat-
isfies f
1
(x) ≥ r
1
. Suppose r
∗
0
= 0. Then r
∗
1
 0, and we may choose a positive real
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number r
1
so large that r
1
:= r
∗
1
/r
1
∈ V. By assumption there exists x ∈ X such that
f
1
(x) ≥ r
1
 0, whence
0 < sup {E [r
∗
1
· f
1
(x)] : x ∈ X} = r
∗
0
sup(P ) = 0.
This contradiction proves r
∗
0
strictly positive. So, in (5) divide through by r
∗
0
and let
y := r
∗
1
/r
∗
0
to have the desired conclusion. 
The following case is commonly known: If X is convex, and f
1
is concave, then
the Slater condition (that some adapted x ∈ X yields strict feasibility: f
1
(x) > 0)
implies r
0
> 0.
3. C  R E 
There is a circumscribed, fixed, finite set I of individual agents, each more or less
plagued by resource scarcity, risk, and technological hurdles. Specifically, individual
i ∈ I faces a stochastic program
v
i
:= sup
{
f
i
0
(x
i
) : x
i
∈ X
i
and f
i
1
(x
i
) ≥ 0
}
of the sort (P
i
) described in Section 2. As there, the objective f
i
0
(x
i
) denotes a
monetary amount, perfectly divisible and transferable. It must be stressed that many
items mentioned in Section 2 are common and publicly known, namely: the time
horizon T, the information flow (F
t
), and the probability space (Ω,F
T+1
, P ).
Quite as above individual i is constrained in two important ways: At each time
t = 1, . . . , T his decisions must satisfy
x
i
t
(ω) ∈ X
i
t
(ω) ⊆ R
n
i
t
and f
i
1t
(ω, x
i
1
(ω), . . . , x
i
t
(ω)) ∈ R
m
t
+
.
These constraints involve sets ω  X
i
t
(ω) and functions (ω, x
i
) → f
i
1t
(ω, x
i
1
(ω), . . . , x
i
t
(ω))
that are F
t
-measurable. Note that the basic decision spacesR
n
i
t
can vary across agents
(and time), but most important: all functions f
i
1t
, i ∈ I, have the same image space
R
m
t
. In this setting a coalition S ⊆ I could achieve stand-alone value
v
S
:= sup
{
∑
i∈S
f
i
0
(x
i
) : x
i
∈ X
i
,∀i ∈ S, and
∑
i∈S
f
i
1
(x
i
) ≥ 0
}
.
Whether that optimal value is computed or not, I tacitly assume, somewhat heroically,
that no agent i misrepresents privately held data to own advantage. (Market games
with differential information have been considered in [2], [3], [19].)
For cooperation to comprise everybody it should leave no individual - and no
coalition - worse off than alone. In other words: the concerting of actions, and the
joining of forces, requires satisfaction of numerous participation constraints. To that
end money transfers (compensations or ”bribes”) may certainly help. These should
reasonably produce a payoff allocation u = (u
i
) ∈ R
I
that entails
Pareto efficiency:
∑
i∈I
u
i
= v
I
,
and stability:
∑
i∈S
u
i
≥ v
S
for all coalitions S ⊂ I.
(6)
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Stability means here that no singleton or set S ⊂ I of several players could improve
their outcome by splitting away from the society.
2
Note that mere stability is easy to
achieve: Simply let the numbers u
i
be so large that
∑
i∈S
u
i
≥ v
S
,∀S ⊆ I. Therefore,
the essential difficulty resides in the efficiency requirement. I ask: Can (6) be solved?
If so, how? These questions fit the frames of a (payoff-sharing) cooperative game with
player set I, characteristic function I ⊇ S → v
S
∈ R∪{−∞} , and side payments.
Any solution u = (u
i
) ∈ R
I
to (6) is said to be an element in the core.
4. C S
usc
Write x = (x
i
) = (x
i
t
) and consider the Lagrangian
L
S
(x, y) :=
{
∑
i∈S
{f
i
0
(x
i
) + E [y · f
i
1
(x
i
)]} if x
i
∈ X
i
for all i ∈ S,
−∞ otherwise
associated to coalition S. As customary, v
S
= sup
x
inf
y∈Y
L
S
(x, y) ≤ sup
x
L
S
(x, y) for
all y ∈ Y. Therefore I declare y¯ ∈ Y a Lagrange multiplier for the grand coalition iff
the reverse inequality hold when S = I, i.e. if sup
x
L
I
(x, y¯) ≤ v
I
. Existence of such
a multiplier is guaranteed under conditions stated in Theorem 1. The next result
shows that any Lagrange multiplier may incite cooperation:
Theorem 2 (Lagrange multipliers yield core solutions). For any Lagrange multi-
plier y¯ of the grand coalition the payoff allocation
u
i
:= sup
{
f
i
0
(x
i
) + E
[
y¯ · f
i
1
(x
i
)
]
: x
i
∈ X
i
}
, i ∈ I,
belongs to the core.
Proof. Stability obtains because any coalition S ⊆ I receives
∑
i∈S
u
i
= sup
x
L
S
(x, y¯) ≥ inf
y∈Y
sup
x
L
S
(x, y) ≥ sup
x
inf
y∈Y
L
S
(x, y) = v
S
, (7)
the very last inequality often being referred to as weak duality. The hypothesis con-
cerning y¯ ensures strong duality. Indeed, that hypothesis yields
∑
i∈I
u
i
= sup
x
L
I
(x, y¯) ≤
v
I
. The upshot is that Pareto efficiency also prevails. 
A slightly different approach helps to understand and supplement Theorem 2. In
view of (1) and (4) let the function
f
i
1t
(ω, x
i
1
, . . . , x
i
t
) = b
i
t
(ω)−A
i
t
(ω,x
i
1
, . . . , x
i
t
) ∈ R
m
t
+
,
explicitly incorporate random resources b
i
t
(ω) ∈ R
m
t
as well as an operator A
i
:
Ω× R
n
i
1
+···+n
i
t
→ R
m
t
. Define then
pi
i
(b
i
) := sup
{
f
i
0
(x
i
)
∣
∣
x
i
t
∈ X
i
t
and b
i
t
−A
i
t
(x
i
1
, . . . , x
i
t
) ≥ 0 for all t
}
,
2
Coalitions are here orthogonal in the sense that members of S can jointly obtain v
S
regardless
of what the outsiders i ∈ IS undertake.
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and consider the program sup
{
∑
i∈I
pi
i
(z
i
)
∣
∣
∑
i∈I
z
i
=
∑
i∈I
b
i
}
. Let y¯ be a La-
grange multiplier of the latter. Then the allocation
u
i
:= E
[
y¯ · b
i
]
+ sup
{
pi
i
(z
i
)− E
[
y¯ · z
i
]
∣
∣
z
i
adapted
}
(8)
belongs to the core. Evidently, formula (8) generalizes Owen’s result, introduced
in Section 1. More precisely: if the resource bundles b
i
mentioned there are ran-
dom, then such endowment commands core payment u
i
= E [y¯ · b
i
] to its owner. The
much studied instance of two-stage linear programs is particularly informative. That
instance posits sure resource availability b
i
1
∈ R
m
1
right now and random supply
ω → b
i
2
(ω) ∈ R
m
2
next period. Consequently, it furnishes cooperative payoff
u
i
= y¯
1
· b
i
1
+ E
[
y¯
2
· b
i
2
]
(9)
to agent i. Formula (9) brings out several noteworthy features: First, if second-stage
endowments are correlated across agents, then most likely E [y¯
2
· b
i
2
] = Ey¯
2
· Eb
i
2
.
Thus, as in finance - and notably within the capital asset pricing model - covariance
between a ”paper” or ”security” b
i
and the aggregate (entire market portfolio) b
I
becomes decisive for its pricing [11]. Intuitively, the expected second-period payment
E [y¯
2
· b
i
2
] to agent i depends then on two things: partly, on his average contribution
Eb
i
2
, and partly, on how his realized contribution b
i
2
(ω) co-varies with the total second-
stage endowment b
I
2
(ω). To see this fact most simply, suppose a single resource comes
into play at the second stage. Then E [y¯
2
· b
i
2
] = Ey¯
2
·Eb
i
2
+ cov(y¯
2
, b
i
2
). Thus an agent
who brings much of a resource when it is scarce, will insure his co-players and thereby
receive handsome compensation.
Another speaking property of (9) is the step-wise, separable nature of payment.
The next section concludes with a more general view at this property.
5. C # 
It is fitting to elaborate on the dynamics of cooperation. For that purpose write
x
i
[1,t]
:= (x
i
1
, . . . , x
i
t
) and assume here time-separable, expected payoff in the form
f
i
0
(x
i
) := E
∑
T
t=1
f
i
0t
(ω, x
i
t
(ω)). Correspondingly, coalition S ⊆ I would now deal with
the Lagrangian
L
S
(x, y) :=
∑
i∈S
T
∑
t=1
E
[
f
i
0t
(ω, x
i
t
(ω)) + y
t
(ω) · f
i
1t
(ω, x
i
[1,t]
(ω))
]
.
Theorem 3 (Multistage core elements). Suppose y¯ is a Lagrange multiplier for the
grand coalition. Then the payoff allocation
u
i
:= sup
x
i
∈X
i
T
∑
t=0
E
[
f
i
0t
(ω, x
i
t
(ω)) + y¯
t
(ω) · f
i
1t
(ω, x
i
[1,t]
(ω))
]
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belongs to the core. Moreover, for any interim time t < T , featuring sunk but optimal
decisions x
[1,t]
= (x
i
[1,t]
)
i∈I
, the remaining cooperative enterprise admits a conditional
core allocation
u
i
t
(x
[1,t]
) := sup
x
i
τ
∈X
i
τ
,τ>t
∑
τ>t
E
[
f
i
0τ
(ω, x
i
τ
(ω)) + y¯
τ
(ω) · f
i
1τ
(ω, x
i
[1,τ]
(ω))
∣
∣
F
t
, x
[1,t]
]
. 
(10)
This result points to the sequential consistency of allocation along the realized path.
That is, the payment scheme u, when stated in terms of contingent transfers (10),
will resist re-negotiation over time and events. Can contracts of that sort come into
existence? Extensive fieldwork often see agents who voluntarily organize themselves
to secure the benefits of trade and mutual risk protection [13]. We stress though
that endowments were private here; the issue was not provision of public goods [12].
Potential application to trade in greenhouse gases is outlined in [6].
R$
[1] J. P. Aubin and H. Frankowska, Set-Valued Analysis, Birkhäuser (1990).
[2] E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz, On the core of an economy with differential
information, J. Economic Theory 94, 262-270 (2000).
[3] E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz, Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-
post core of an economy with asymmetric information, J. Mathematical Economics
34, 527-535 (2000).
[4] I. V. Evstigneev and S. D. Flåm, Sharing nonconvex cost, to appear in J. Global
Optimization (2001).
[5] I. V. Evstigneev and S. D. Flåm, Stochastic programming: nonanticipativity and
Lagrange multipliers, in Encyclopedia of Optimization, Kluwer (2001).
[6] S. D. Flåm, Greenhouse gases and cooperation, paper 2001.
[7] D. Granot, A Generalized Linear Production Model: A Unifying Model, Mathematical
Programming, 43, 212-222 (1986).
[8] D. Granot, Cooperative Games in Stochastic Characteristic Function Form, Manage-
ment Science, 23(6), 621-630 (1977).
[9] J. R. G. van Gellekom et al., Characterization of the Owen set of linear production
processes, Games and Economic Behavior 32, 139-156 (2000).
[10] E. Kalai, E. and E. Zemel, Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced
Games, Operations Research, 30(5), 998-1008 (1982).
[11] M. Magill and M. Quinzii, Theory of Incomplete Markets I, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass. (1996).
S
 P
, C


,  R E 9
[12] Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Harvard University Press, MA (1965).
[13] E. Ostrom, Collective actions and the evolution of social norms, J. Economic Perspec-
tives, 14, 2 137-158 (2000).
[14] G. Owen, On the Core of Linear Production Games, Mathematical Programming, 9,
358-370 (1975).
[15] R. T. Rockafellar, Duality and optimality in multistage stochastic programming, An-
nals of Operations Research 85, 1-19 (1999).
[16] A. Ruszczynski, Decomposition methods in stochastic programming, Mathematical
Programming 70, 333-353 (1997).
[17] M. Sandsmark, Production games under uncertainty, Computational Economics 14,
237-253 (1999).
[18] D. Samet and E. Zemel, On the Core and Dual Set of Linear Programming Games,
Mathematics of Operations Research, 9(2), 309-316 (1994).
[19] R. Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy with differential infor-
mation, Econometrica 40, 807-816 (1978).
